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“The Race to the Bottom”
Competition in the Law of Property
John V. Orth
“The race to the bottom” is a phrase made famous in the his-tory of the law of business asso-
ciations.1 Starting in the 1890s, New Jersey 
and Delaware competed for the privilege of 
chartering corporations (and reaping the 
associated economic benefits). The states 
engaged in a sort of Dutch auction, progres-
sively offering better and better, that is, low-
er and lower, terms in their standard-form 
corporate charters. Eventually, New Jersey 
dropped out of the running, and Delaware 
won the race – which, of course, is why to-
day one of the nation’s smallest states hosts 
the “headquarters” of so many large corpo-
rations and why the Delaware Chancery 
Court is one of the world’s busiest business 
courts.
Competition between American states 
is not surprising. The single economic and 
social union that is the United States, le-
gally bound up by the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause of the Federal Constitution,2 makes 
it almost inevitable. The state of Nevada is 
an obvious example. Permissive divorce laws 
made it an early destination for unhappy 
couples,3 just as relaxed marriage require-
ments still make it popular with hopeful 
John V. Orth is the William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill. This article is the sixth in his series of reappraisals in the law of property.
 1 See, e.g., 2 Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States 58 (2002). The 
classic statement of the race-to-the-bottom thesis is William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: 
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663 (1974). Whether the race was truly to the “bottom” is de-
bated; whether there was even a race at all is denied. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan s Ehud Kamar, The Myth of 
State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 679 (2002). The race-to-the-bottom metaphor is 
nowadays also used to describe and decry the effects of globalization. See, e.g., Robert J.S. Ross s Anita 
Chan, From North-South to South-South: The True Face of Global Competition, 81:5 Foreign Affairs 8 
(Sept./Oct. 2002) (“The absence of a mechanism establishing international labor standards is propel-
ling the economies of the South in a race to the bottom in wages and labor conditions.”).
 2 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, 
and judicial Proceedings of every other State … .”).
 3 In the days of the British Empire, the central authorities were particularly concerned that divergent 
divorce laws in various parts of the Empire would lead to people “running from place to place in search 
of divorces.” Bruce Kercher, An Unruly Child: A History of Law in Australia 139 (1995).
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young people.4 Legalized gambling attracts 
millions of visitors annually, even as other 
states (and Indian reservations) have entered 
the field.5 Still the only state to allow betting 
on collegiate athletics and to give most of its 
counties the option to legalize prostitution, 
Nevada continues to exploit its law-making, 
or rather its law-repealing, advantages. It is 
ironic that a state so closely associated in the 
public mind with lawlessness and the Mob 
is the supreme example of the law’s power to 
influence behavior.
Whether this competition is good or bad 
depends on one’s point of view. The phrase 
“race to the bottom” obviously encodes a 
negative judgment, but a different label sug-
gests a different conclusion. In a celebrated 
dissent, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis 
Brandeis described as “one of the happy in-
cidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, 
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social 
and economic experiments without risk to 
the rest of the country.”6 Although Brandeis 
had legal restrictions on economic competi-
tion in mind, his formula applies equally well 
to the removal of restraints, social as well as 
economic. If one approves of the result, or is 
at least willing to give it a chance, “social ex-
periment” is a happier description than “race 
to the bottom.”
While these legal experiments are in 
progress, they provide a social safety valve, an 
outlet for those activities that are elsewhere 
illegal.7 Observation of the outcome may 
eventually convince other states to follow 
their example. In the meantime, these “social 
laboratories” produce “experimental law” not 
only for their own citizens, but also for those 
with the time and money necessary to travel 
to the appropriate legal marketplace. Of 
course, in a democratic society the existence 
of “law for the elites” – or, to be more pre-
cise, venues for elites to get the law they pre-
fer – increases the pressure on other states 
to “democratize” the benefit (and not lose 
out on the profits). What ended the attrac-
tion of the “Reno divorce” was the adoption 
of relaxed divorce laws in other states. Gam-
bling works for Nevada, providing the state 
with sufficient revenue to maintain a low-tax 
regime, thereby attracting new residents and 
businesses, and increasing the pressure on 
other states to offer gambling opportuni-
ties. Without Nevada’s legislative power, Las 
Vegas and much of the state would still be 
 4 The Clark County, Nevada, Marriage License Bureau is open seven days a week 8am to midnight and 
24 hours on legal holidays. No blood test is required and there is no waiting period; the fee is about $35. 
Frommer’s Las Vegas 2001 at 184–85 (2001). Nevadans seem to have lost their nerve when it came 
to toleration of same-sex marriage. Not only did Massachusetts win that race by legalizing such unions, 
see Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), but Nevadans even amended 
their state constitution to prohibit their state from competing for the business. Nev. Const. art. I, § 21 
(“Only a marriage between a male and female person shall be recognized and given effect in this state.”). 
See John V. Orth, Night Thoughts: Reflections on the Debate Concerning Same-Sex Marriage, 3 Nev. L. J. 
560 (2003).
 5 Today 198 federally recognized Indian tribes run 326 gambling facilities in 28 states, generating about 
$10 billion annually, one-seventh of all legal gambling proceeds. Craig Lambert, Trafficking in Chance, 
Harvard Magazine 33, 40 ( July-August 2002).
 6 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The same advan-
tage has been touted for the Australian Federation. The proposed constitution of the European Union 
describes the process with the anodyne phrase “open method of coordination.” See Kalypso Nicolaidis, 
“We, the Peoples of Europe…,” 83:6 Foreign Affairs 97, 105–06 (2004).
 7 Legalized betting on collegiate sports, restricted to Nevada by a 1993 federal law, is sometimes justified 
as a means of monitoring the illegal betting that undoubtedly occurs in other states and providing a 
legal outlet for complaints about tampering with student athletes. See Chad Millman, The Odds: 
One Season, Three Gamblers, and the Death of Their Las Vegas 186–91 (2001).
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uninhabited desert.
Elites do not necessarily need to travel 
to take advantage of favorable legal regimes.8 
Given the fact that money is easily transmit-
ted within the United States, competition 
has broken out among the states to secure 
the trust business of the wealthy by offer-
ing better (that is, less restrictive) trust law.9 
When Delaware recently repealed the Rule 
Against Perpetuities as applied to trusts, it 
freely admitted in the preamble to its stat-
ute that the purpose was to keep the state’s 
banks and trust companies competitive in at-
tracting capital. Pointing the finger at “several 
innovative jurisdictions that have abolished 
the rule,” the statute recited that “[s]everal 
financial institutions have now organized 
or acquired trust companies, particularly in 
South Dakota, at least in part to take ad-
vantage of their favorable trust law.”10 Deter-
mined to beat these states at their own game 
and “maintain Delaware’s role as the most 
favored jurisdiction for the establishment 
of trusts,” the state went on to authorize the 
creation of self-settled spendthift trusts that 
protect the settlor’s assets from the claims of 
creditors.11
Competition creates a “market” for laws 
not only between states in a federal union 
but also between courts of concurrent juris-
diction operating in the same state. In Eng-
land before the Judicature Acts of 1873–75,12 
the three common-law courts of King’s 
(Queen’s) Bench, Common Pleas, and Ex-
chequer exercised overlapping jurisdiction. 
Throughout the Middle Ages, a lively com-
petition among these courts, driven by the 
judges’ desire to augment their incomes with 
fees from the litigants, had produced sub-
stantial improvements in justice.13 The ac-
tion of ejectment, which began as a tenant’s 
remedy, was made available as a means to 
try title to land by the toleration of a con-
venient legal fiction; because of procedural 
advantages, it relegated the “proper” remedy, 
the writ of right, to oblivion.14 The action of 
trover, which began as a finder’s remedy (as 
its French name implies), became the means 
to try title to chattels by a similar fiction and 
won out over the ancient action of detinue, 
 8 Travel is obviously necessary if actual physical presence is required, as for marriage or divorce. Gam-
bling, too, requires a presence in the state since the Interstate Wire Act of 1960 prohibits the placing 
of bets over means of interstate communication, such as the telephone and internet. In some cases, 
personal presence may actually be a disadvantage. For trusts located in Delaware, no state income tax is 
levied if the beneficiaries live in another state.
 9 There has long been competition for trust business between American states, on the one hand, and 
foreign nations, particularly small island nations, on the other. What foreign nations could not offer, of 
course, was the stability and security of American law.
 10 1996 Laws of Del., ch. 538 (amending Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, § 503), preamble quoted in Jesse 
Dukeminier s Stanley M. Johanson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates 854 (6th ed. 2000). South 
Dakota had earlier repealed the Rule Against Perpetuities. S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 43–5-4; 
43–5-8. See Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No Friends – An 
Essay, 35 Real Prop., Probate s Trust J. 601 (2000); Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to 
Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 2097 (2003).
 11 Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3570 ff. (2002). See John E. Sullivan III, Gutting the Rule Against Self-Set-
tled Trusts: How the New Delaware Trust Law Competes With Offshore Trusts, 23 Del. J. Corp. L. 423 
(1998). Previously, spendthrift provisions were limited to trusts for the benefit of others than the settlor. 
George T. Bogert, Trusts § 40, p. 155 (6th ed. 1987) (“a property owner may not create a spendthrift 
trust in his own favor”).
 12 36 s 37 Vict. c. 66 (1873); 38 s 39 Vict. c. 77 (1875).
 13 For a brief survey, see John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law 32–35 (2d ed., 
Roland Gray ed., 1927). For a facetious summary with a serious intent, see John V. Orth, A Reverie on 
Medieval Judges, Milton Friedman, and the Supreme Court’s Workload, 69 A.B.A.J. 1454 (1983).
 14 See 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 199–206 (1768).
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also because of procedural advantages.15
In addition, the English Chancery Court, 
usually known as “equity,” was famously avail-
able to supplement the common law when-
ever the legal remedy was inadequate, leaving 
a legacy that survived the eventual merger in 
most jurisdictions of law and equity.16 The 
trust for a married woman’s “sole and sepa-
rate use” offered wealthy fathers a means to 
circumvent the male-dominated common 
law and protect a daughter’s property from 
her husband and his creditors. The celebrat-
ed passage of Married Women’s Property 
Acts in England and America in the mid-
nineteenth century made the benefits avail-
able to all married women.17
In the United States the federal system 
gave litigants a choice of federal or state 
courts in many private law actions, at least 
when the parties were not citizens of the 
same state. For almost a century after Swift 
v. Tyson (1842),18 federal judges exploited 
this “diversity jurisdiction” to offer litigants 
a national brand of commercial law. Only in 
1938 did the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad 
v. Tompkins19 put an end to this competi-
tion, commonly known by the bad name of 
“forum shopping.” Luckily for industries en-
gaged in interstate commerce, other forces 
– national legal education, scholarly treatises, 
and uniform acts – were by then available to 
provide the homogenization once provided 
by the federal courts.
Legal competition occurs not only be-
tween states or courts; it even occurs be-
tween legal doctrines within the same ju-
risdiction. Where there are two different 
means to the same end, lawyers and judges 
will constantly be required to compare and 
contrast them, and litigants will advance 
one or the other as it suits their interests. 
It is a staple of first-year property law that 
inter vivos gifts of personal property re-
quire donative intent, delivery, and accep-
tance.20 Of the three, delivery is the most 
problematic, as the cases amply attest. Left 
to more advanced property courses is the 
fact that by a mere oral declaration of trust 
a donor may transfer beneficial title (the 
only one that usually matters) without de-
 15 See 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 150–53 (1768).
 16 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme 
Court.…,” i.e., not in separate courts of law and equity as in England at the time); N.C. Const. art. IV, 
§ 13 (“There shall be in this State but one form of action for the enforcement or protection of private 
rights or the redress of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action…,” i.e., not separate 
actions at law and suits in equity) (original in N.C. Const. of 1868 art. IV, § 1). See John V. Orth, The 
North Carolina Constitution: A Reference Guide 112 (1993). In England the merger of law 
and equity was complete by 1875, but a few common law jurisdictions retained separate equity courts 
much longer. The Australian state of New South Wales maintained the separation until 1972. Patrick 
Parkinson, Tradition and Change in Australian Law 157–58 (2d ed. 2001). The state of Dela-
ware still does.
 17 See A.V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England 
During the Nineteenth Century 371–98 (2d ed. 1914). See also N.C. Const. art. X, § 4 (“The 
real and personal property of any female in this State acquired before marriage, and all property, real 
and personal, to which she may, after marriage, become in any manner entitled, shall be and remain the 
sole and separate estate and property of such female, and shall not be liable for any debts, obligations, or 
engagements of her husband, and may be devised and bequeathed and conveyed by her….”) (original in 
N.C. Const. of 1868 art. X, § 6); John V. Orth, The North Carolina Constitution: A Refer-
ence Guide 154–55 (1993).
 18 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 1 (1842).
 19 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling Swift). See generally Tony A. Freyer, Harmony and Discourse: 
The Swift and Erie Cases in American Federalism (1981).
 20 Ray Andrews Brown, The Law of Personal Property § 38, p. 84 (2d ed. 1955).
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livery.21 The roots of the two doctrines lie 
in the dual sources of Anglo-American ju-
risprudence. Law, with its tradition of fixed 
rules and remedies, gave rise to the formal 
requirements for gifts,22 while equity, with 
its emphasis on intention and consequent 
tolerance of informality, was the home of 
the trust.
Maintaining the distinction between gifts 
and trusts has been a recurring preoccupa-
tion of judges and property scholars. In the 
first part of the nineteenth century, a line of 
English cases threatened to eliminate the 
legal requirement of delivery altogether by 
treating almost any manifestation of donative 
intent as a declaration of trust.23 Sir George 
Jessel, himself an influential equity judge, fi-
nally put an end to this development in 1874 
by ruling that “for a man to make himself a 
trustee there must be an expression of inten-
tion to become a trustee, whereas words of 
present gift shew an intention to give over 
property to another, and not to retain it in 
the donor’s own hands for any purpose, fidu-
ciary or otherwise.”24 In America, Professor 
Austin Scott, a founding scholar of the mod-
ern law of trusts, frowned on cases where 
an intended gift fails for lack of delivery but 
courts nonetheless “torture,” as he put it, “an 
imperfect gift into a declaration of trust.”25 
While nominally concerned with discern-
ing intention – to make a present gift or to 
create a trust – the real concern seems to be 
with drawing the proper legal lines.
The effect again is to create law for the 
elites, this time not in the sense of those with 
the resources to travel (or send their money) 
to the most attractive legal marketplace but 
in the sense of those with the best lawyers. 
The legally well advised may undoubtedly 
make gifts without delivery by making an ex-
press and well attested declaration that they 
hold legal title as trustee for the beneficiary-
donee. A simple donor of a common law gift, 
on the other hand, must see to it that there 
is an actual delivery of the item itself (or at 
least some part or symbol of it) or risk the 
failure of the transfer.26 The ironic result of 
the continued distinction is that the courts 
will enforce an oral declaration that A gives 
B the beneficial interest in a chattel while re-
taining the legal interest, but will not enforce 
an oral declaration that A gives B the entire 
interest.27
 21 The beneficial title acquired by the donee in a declaration of trust is in one situation inferior to the 
legal title acquired by the donee of a completed inter vivos gift: if the trustee disposes of the property 
to a purchaser for value and without notice of the equitable interest, the purchaser’s title prevails over 
the donee’s title. George T. Bogert, Trusts § 165, p. 597 (6th ed. 1987) (“bona fide purchaser rule”). 
Of course, the beneficiary in such a situation is entitled to enforce a constructive trust on the property 
acquired by the trustee in exchange for the trust corpus. Rest. 2d Trusts § 202 (“trust pursuit rule”).
 22 The delivery requirement in the law of gifts has very ancient antecedents and has been related to the 
comparable requirement in the early law of feoffments, livery of seisin. See Cochrane v. Moore, 25 Q.B.D. 
57, 65–66 (C.A. 1890).
 23 Ex parte Pye, 18 Ves. Jun. 140, 34 Eng. Rep. 271 (Ch  . 1811); Morgan v. Malleson, L.R. 10 Eq. 475 (1870).
 24 Richards v. Delbridge, L.R. 18 Eq. 11, 15 (1874).
 25 1 Austin W. Scott, The Law of Trusts § 31, p. 321 (4th ed., William F. Fratcher ed., 1987). Scott 
did allow that in case the intended donee of a failed inter vivos gift reasonably relied on the prospective 
benefit, a constructive trust could be impressed, but he insisted that in such case “equity is not convert-
ing an imperfect gift into a declaration of trust, but is merely imposing a duty on the donor in order to 
prevent unjust enrichment.” Id. § 31.4, p. 350.
 26 Actual delivery of the donated chattel may be excused if it is too bulky or if, for some good reason, it is 
not at hand, but some symbol of it must be actually delivered. Ray Andrews Brown, The Law of 
Personal Property § 41, p. 102 (2d ed. 1955). The legal fiction of “constructive delivery” was the com-
mon law’s way of mitigating the harshness of the delivery rule.
 27 See C.B. Labatt, The Inconsistencies of the Laws of Gifts, 29 Am. L. Rev. 361, 368 (1895).
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The alternative of a declaration of trust 
has not been altogether without effect on 
the law of gifts. The delivery requirement is 
subject to constant pressure not only from 
the increased value now assigned to inten-
tion but also from the existence of a paral-
lel gifting procedure that never required 
delivery.28 Recent Restatements of the Law 
reflect the current ambivalence. While the 
Restatement (Second) of Property officially 
takes no position on whether a gift may be 
effective without delivery, it does take note of 
the fact that “a beneficial interest in personal 
property can be conferred on another person 
by an oral declaration of trust even though 
there is no delivery” and suggests that “the 
law should recognize, to the extent it has not 
already done so, that a completed gift of per-
sonal property may be accomplished without 
a delivery by proof of the donor’s manifested 
intention to make a gift.”29 The Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts straddles the same divide. 
To the black-letter rule that “[i]f a property 
owner intends to make an outright gift in-
ter vivos but fails to make the transfer that 
is required in order to do so, the gift inten-
tion will not be given effect by treating it as 
a declaration of trust,” the reporter appends 
the subversive comment that “the preferred 
interpretation in marginal cases of this type 
is not that the property owner was merely 
expressing an intention to make a gift in the 
future but rather that the owner intended a 
declaration of trust.”30
This tension is unlikely to be easily re-
solved. The judges, who created the delivery 
requirement in the first place, are reluctant to 
abandon it not only because of their profes-
sional attachment to traditional doctrine but 
also because it gives them added flexibility in 
the administration of justice. As one court 
that had occasion to consider the alternatives 
put it: “Obviously, it would be neither advis-
able nor wise to abrogate the requirement of 
delivery in any and all cases of intended inter-
vivos gifts, for to do so, even under the guise 
of enforcing equitable rights, might open the 
door to fraudulent claims.”31 The delivery re-
quirement, in other words, provides another 
line of defense against ambiguous or self-
serving testimony about donative intent.
A similar competition, but one with far 
greater consequences, has affected gratu-
itous transfers at death. Ordinarily effected 
by the last will and testament, the inter- 
generational transfer of wealth may also be 
arranged through an ever-lengthening list of 
alternatives. The modern will, the product 
of statutes beginning in the sixteenth cen-
tury,32 generally requires a writing, signed by 
the testator and attested by two witnesses. 
Recognized centuries before the first Stat-
ute of Wills, the joint tenancy in land with 
its associated right of survivorship long pro-
vided an alternative legal means for arrang-
ing succession at death.33 The development 
 28 See Sarajane Love, Imperfect Gifts as Declarations of Trust: An Unapologetic Anomaly, 67 Ky. L.J. 309 
(1979); Chad A. McGowan, Special Delivery: Does the Postman Have to Ring at All? The Current State of 
the Delivery Requirement for Valid Gifts, 31 Real Prop., Probate, s Trust J. 357 (1996).
 29 Rest. 2d Prop. Donative Transfers § 31.1, comment k. This is true, but only in the sense of a gift of 
the beneficial interest.
 30 Rest. 3d Trusts § 16 (2), comment d.
 31 Hebrew Univ. Assoc. v. Dye, 223 A.2d 397, 401 (Conn. Superior Ct. 1966) (upholding gift by finding 
delivery of written instrument). Cf. Hebrew Univ. Assoc. v. Dye, 169 A.2d 641 (Conn. Superior Ct. 1961)          
(finding insufficient evidence of express declaration of trust).
 32 See Kenelm Edward Digby, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Real Prop-
erty 377–92 (5th ed. 1897) (tracing legislation from 1530 to 1837).
 33 See John V. Orth, Joint Tenancy Law, Plus ça Change, 5 Green Bag 2d 173–80 (2002). A joint tenancy 
in land is not an exact alternative to a will, because a present interest vests in the cotenant at the creation 
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of modern banking and the invention of 
the joint and survivor bank account gener-
alized this to include personal property in 
the form of deposits, so much so that these 
accounts have been dubbed the “poor man’s 
will.”34 Modern brokerage houses offer the 
same option for investment accounts. The 
insurance industry pioneered the pay-on-
death contract, and the federal government 
adopted this attractive feature for United 
States savings bonds. A few states allow a 
death beneficiary to be named in a deed of 
land.35
It is the trust, however, that has become 
the ultimate “will substitute.”36 As befits its 
equitable origin, the trust may be created 
with few formalities and allows great flexibil-
ity. During life, a settlor may transfer assets 
into a revocable trust, reserving a life estate 
and specifying future interests; if unrevoked 
at death, the trust then disposes of the prop-
erty. Modern estate planners, astute not to 
lose the ambulatory potential of testamen-
tary dispositions, generally add a “pour-over 
will,” which transfers to the trust any assets 
remaining in the settlor’s sole name at death. 
Trust law is typically elite law. The revocable-
trust-pour-over-will arrangement is for well 
advised, usually wealthy clients. Without 
competent advice, settlors of small trusts, of-
ten of the do-it-yourself variety, sometimes 
forget to keep their trust documents current 
and end up with improperly titled property 
and poorly maintained records, resulting in 
unnecessary expense and occasionally unin-
tended dispositions.37
As with inter vivos gifts, the simultaneous 
existence of a less formal means to the same 
end has placed tremendous pressure on the 
more formalized alternative. If simpler will 
substitutes are available, how can statutory 
will formalities that might defeat intention 
be justified? In fact, wills law is now subject 
to searching criticism and a movement is 
underway in favor of disregarding “harmless 
error” in execution, permitting “substantial 
compliance” with the formalities, or simply 
granting the judiciary a power to dispense 
with the necessary forms.38
Labels encode conclusions. They do not   
(or should not) dictate them. The “race to the 
bottom” is competition to get to a destina-
tion we do not wish to reach, while “social 
experiments” sound at once scientific and 
of the estate.
 34 See In re Estate of Michaels, 132 N.W.2d 557 (Wis. 1965). See also Note, Disposition of Bank Accounts: 
The Poor Man’s Will, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 103 (1953). Unlike the joint tenancy in land, no interest passes 
to a donee “co-depositor” at the creation of the account, only a power to draw on deposited funds, which 
explains why the federal gift tax is not imposed until an amount is actually withdrawn by the non-de-
positing party.
 35 See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59–3501; Ohio Rev. Stat. 5302.22.
 36 The trust, in its guise as a “use,” was available before the first Statute of Wills to provide a functional 
alternative in equity. See Kenelm Edward Digby, An Introduction to the History of the 
Law of Real Property 330–33 (5th ed. 1897). It is an irony of history that the trust (use) was a will 
substitute before there were wills, and that, after centuries of eclipse by the will proper, it has resumed 
this role.
 37 See, e.g., Austin, Trustee v. City of Alexandria, 574 S.E.2d 289 (Va. 2003) (holding ineffective a second 
transfer by a settlor who had previously transferred the same property into a revocable trust); Secor 
Investments v. Anderegg, 71 P.3d 538 (Or. 2003) (illustrating the distinct legal personalities of the settlor 
as an individual and as the trustee of a self-settled inter vivos trust); First Nat’l Bank of Bar Harbor v. 
Anthony, 557 A.2d 957 (Me. 1989) (holding ineffective an apparent attempt to revoke a revocable inter 
vivos trust by a will).
 38 See Uniform Probate Code § 2–503 (harmless error); John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance 
With the Wills Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1975). See also John V. Orth, Intention in the Law of Property: 
The Law of Unintended Consequences, 8 Green Bag 2d 59 (2004).
5 	 9 	G r e e n 	Ba g 	 2d 	 7
	 John 	V. 	O r t h
courageous. Competition is probably inevi-
table in a federal system, and may well be 
desirable. Rather than worry about whether 
we are in a race to somewhere-or-other, we 
should concentrate our attention on the end 
we want to attain, then on the means to get 
there. “Law for elites” has an unwholesome 
sound in a democracy; only a “savage race,” 
as Tennyson so memorably put it, deserves 
“unequal laws.”39 But equal laws do not nec-
essarily serve everyone equally well. Seeking 
the least common denominator, commenta-
tors and judges may well be distracted from 
the real project of providing formal require-
ments appropriate to the transaction and its 
likely participants.  
 39 Alfred Tennyson, Ulysses (1842) l. 4.
